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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-3791
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,
a/k/a
ANDY FLORES-TINEO,
Appellant.
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(No. 2-10-cr-00854-2)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 14, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 27, 2012)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Antonio Rodriguez appeals his sentence of 170 months imprisonment imposed
after his plea of guilty to conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and
one kilogram or more of heroin. Rodriguez argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
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and that the sentencing judge violated his due process rights by mentioning an unresolved
drug charge as a reason for refusing to downward adjust his criminal history level. For
the following reasons, we reject Rodriguez’s contentions and affirm his sentence.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts relevant to
our resolution of this appeal. In June of 2010, law enforcement officials in Linden, New
Jersey observed an individual removing an unidentified package from a 2007 Jeep
Cherokee during the course of a suspicious encounter with other individuals. Officials
later seized $999,000 in cash from the tractor trailer driven by the first individual. Two
weeks later, officers conducting surveillance of a different tractor trailer observed
Rodriguez and a co-conspirator, Luis Mendez-Rivera, arrive at a hotel in South
Plainfield, New Jersey in the same jeep they had previously observed. Rodriguez and
Mendez-Rivera entered the hotel, as did the driver of the tractor trailer, who was later
identified as Javier Ramirez. The three men drove together in the jeep to two separate
warehouses, then returned to the hotel parking lot. There, the officers found
approximately 14.6 kilograms of cocaine and 15.8 kilograms of heroin in a hidden
compartment in Ramirez’s tractor trailer. The subsequent investigation revealed that
Rodriguez had traveled outside of New Jersey to coordinate narcotics activities, and had
directed the delivery of the $999,000 in cash two weeks earlier.
On April 7, 2011, Rodriguez appeared before a Magistrate Judge to plead guilty to
one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, and one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and
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(b)(1)(A), and of 21 U.S.C. § 846. At the beginning of the hearing, the Magistrate
adjourned the proceedings to give Rodriguez an opportunity to review the plea agreement
and related documents with the assistance of his attorney and a court interpreter. When
the hearing resumed later that day, Rodriguez testified under oath that the plea agreement
had been read to him in Spanish, that he had had enough time to speak to his attorney
about the agreement, and that he was satisfied with the assistance his counsel had
provided in reviewing the agreement. The Court then conducted a thorough colloquy,
and concluded that Rodriguez’s plea was knowing and voluntary. It therefore
recommended that the district court accept the plea, which it did on May 5, 2011.
A probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in
advance of sentencing. The PSR calculated a total offense level of 33, resulting in an
advisory guideline range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. The PSR also placed
Rodriguez in Criminal History Category II, based on a prior conviction in October of
2000 for illegal reentry into the United States. The PSR noted the existence of a pending
charge against Rodriguez in Bronx County Supreme Court, New York, arising from an
arrest in 1999 for possession of an illegal substance. The PSR explained that the
probation officer had obtained a report from the New York City Police Department
regarding the charge, which involved possession of more than four ounces of cocaine,
and that a bench warrant issued in the year 2000 remained outstanding in connection with
that charge. The PSR also noted that Rodriguez claimed to the probation officer that a
relative had left a package at his home that he later discovered to contain drugs, and that
he called the police to report the incident but was arrested.
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Rodriguez made two written motions prior to the sentencing hearing, one for a
minor role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.2 and 2D1.1(a)(3), and one for a
downward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) on the ground that his criminal
history category overstated his true past criminality. With regard to the second argument,
Rodriguez noted that his criminal activities had all occurred within a nine-month period
more than nine years prior to sentencing, which was close to the ten year outside period
for consideration of past criminality, and that he had led a crime-free life since.
On September 28, 2011, the District Court held a sentencing hearing, which
proceeded as follows. Rodriguez’s counsel started by disputing the statement in the PSR
that Rodriguez had paid for Mendez-Rivera’s attorney’s fees. The District Court
indicated it would not consider the issue in connection with Rodriguez’s sentencing and
the government stipulated it would not raise the issue in connection with the minor role
adjustment motion. A. 117-20. Next, Rodriguez’s counsel made reference to his motion
for a minor role adjustment and rested that motion on his papers. A. 121. He then
proceeded to argue the motion to adjust the level of criminality largely on the basis of his
written submission. In its rebuttal, the government noted that far from understating
Rodriguez’s true level of criminality, the criminal history category “fails to account for
the fact that [Rodriguez] still has that cocaine possession case outstanding.” A. 125.
The District Court then ruled on the motions. It denied the minor role adjustment
motion based on its understanding of Rodriguez’s involvement in the conspiracy from the
sentencing of Rodriguez’s co-conspirator, Mendez-Rivera, as well as on the fact that
Rodriguez had directed the delivery of almost a million dollars in cash and on the
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“enormous quantity” of drugs in the conspirators’ possession. A. 126-27. The District
Court also rejected the argument that the criminal history level overstated Rodriguez’s
true criminality. The Court reasoned that there would always be crimes that occurred
close to the ten-year cutoff for considering past criminal activity and therefore that was
insufficient reason to give such convictions less weight. The Court also noted that given
that Rodriguez had been out of the United States for most of the past nine years she
would not assume without more information that he had led a crime-free life during that
period. Finally, the District Judge commented that Rodriguez had, as the government
suggested, “other charges of a similar ilk still unresolved.” A. 126. Rodriguez did not
object to the inclusion of the 1999 arrest and charge in the PSR and did not object to the
sentencing court’s mention of that matter during the proceeding.
After noting that there were no variance applications by either side, the Court next
considered the parties’ arguments with respect to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Rodriguez’s counsel argued that the amount of familial support received by Rodriguez
“says volumes” of him, because in counsel’s experience this phenomenon was unusual.
Defense counsel further noted that counsel “c[a]me from a middle class family” and that
familial abandonment “wouldn’t have existed in [defense counsel’s] world.” A. 131-32.
The government then argued for a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range in part
because Rodriguez “was arrested in New York for possession of a fairly substantial
amount of cocaine” and that despite Rodriguez’s explanations “the fact remains that he
was arrested and that that case is still pending out there and it involved drugs.” A. 141.
The District Court sentenced Rodriguez to 170 months in prison, the middle of the
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advisory guidelines range, without mentioning the pending charge. This appeal followed.
II.
The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, Rodriguez first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) not

fully explaining to him the consequences of the plea in Spanish, (b) making prejudiced
statements about Rodriguez’s social class when he argued that familial support was not
common for defendants like Rodriguez, (c) failing to orally press the minor role
adjustment motion at the sentencing hearing, and (d) failing to investigate certain issues
that arose at sentencing, most notably whether Rodriguez had indeed led a crime-free life
while he was outside of the United States, and the resolution of Rodriguez’s prior arrest
in New York in 1999.
Subject to certain narrow exceptions, it is well settled that we do not entertain
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v.
Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 371 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We entertain such claims on
direct appeal only when “the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective
assistance [and] there is no need for further factual development.” United States v.
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that Rodriguez’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims do not fall within any cognizable exception to the general
rule. Without a fully developed record, we cannot determine whether trial counsel’s
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failure to fill certain factual gaps violated the Sixth Amendment. Such claims must
therefore be entertained in the first instance by the district court in a § 2255 proceeding.
B.

The District Court’s mention of Rodriguez’s prior arrest

Relying on our decision in United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir.
2009), Rodriguez also argues that “[b]y considering the mere fact of [his] prior arrest as a
basis for denying his application for a more lenient sentence, the District Court violated
[his] right to due process.” Appellant’s Br. at 37. Because Rodriguez did not raise this
issue before the District Court, it is subject to plain error review. Berry, 553 F.3d at 279.
To prevail, Rodriguez must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that
affects a defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. (citation omitted).
The defendant’s guideline range in Berry was 30 to 37 months in prison, based in
part on the fact that the PSR there placed him at a category history level one. Id. at 27576. The PSR also noted that Berry had been arrested twice as an adult, that one arrest had
turned into a charge had been dropped due to lack of prosecution, and the other arrest had
been “nol prossed.” Id. at 275-76. At sentencing, Berry’s defense counsel emphasized
that Berry had no prior convictions, but the court rejected the argument, noting that
“reading between the lines—this seems rather obvious that the reason he doesn’t have
any actual adult convictions is because of the breakdowns in the court—in the state court
system-and not because of innocence.” Id. at 277. In connection with its consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court later reiterated that it did not think the criminal
history category “reflect[ed] quite adequately the seriousness of their criminal exposure
in the past,” and ultimately sentenced Berry to 36 months. Id. at 279.
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We vacated Berry’s sentence on two grounds. First, we noted that the district
court’s assumption that the lack of conviction was a result of a breakdown in the court
system was based on nothing “other than rank speculation,” id. at 278. Second, we held
that, as a matter of law, due process does not permit a district court to consider “a bare
arrest record—without more” and that such record “does not justify an assumption that a
defendant has committed other crimes and it therefore cannot support increasing his/her
sentence in the absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.” Id. at 283. We stressed
that “[i]t is the fact of the increase based upon inadequate evidence, not the mechanism
by which the increase is accomplished that offends due process.” Id. at 284. However,
we also made clear in Berry that we “permit consideration of the underlying conduct
where reliable evidence of that conduct is proffered or where the PSR adequately details
the underlying facts without objection from the defendant.” Id.
Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not
plainly violate the principles of Berry. First, unlike the court in Berry, the District Court
here did not rely on dismissed charges or on a “nol prossed” arrest that also formed the
basis of the federal conviction. Instead, it relied on a pending charge for which a bench
warrant was outstanding. Indeed, in Berry we recognized that “avoiding adjudication of
guilt by failing to appear is quite different from never obtaining an adjudication of guilt
because the charges were dismissed.” Id. at 282 (citations omitted). Second, the PSR
and the District Court did not rely on a “bare” record “without more.” The probation
officer obtained a report from the New York City Police Department and interviewed
Rodriguez regarding the charge. This was more information than that before the district
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court in Berry. Moreover, Rodriguez never objected to the information contained in the
PSR with respect to this charge. Thus, the PSR here, unlike that in Berry, “detail[ed] the
underlying facts without objection from the defendant.” Id. at 284. Finally, the District
Court mentioned the prior charge only once, in ruling on Rodriguez’s motion for a
criminal history adjustment, which it denied for other reasons in addition to the pending
charge. By contrast, the court in Berry relied on prior arrests both in the context of the
criminal history adjustment and in selecting the final sentence as it considered the
§ 3553(a) factors, and mentioned the prior arrest as the only reason to deny the motion
for a criminal history adjustment. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in
mentioning Rodriguez’s pending charge during the sentencing hearing.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
without prejudice to Rodriguez raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a
properly instituted proceeding under § 2255.
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